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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

CLENDENIN BROS., INC. v. U.S. FIRE INS. CO.: TOTAL
POLLUTION EXCLUSION PROVISIONS IN COMMERCIAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES DO NOT RELIEVE THE
INSURER FROM ITS DUTY TO DEFEND THE INSURED
WHERE THE ALLEGED HARM WAS CAUSED BY
WORKPLACE MANGANESE FUMES
By: Jennifer Birckhead

In an issue of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a total pollution exclusion provision in a commercial
insurance policy does not relieve the insurer from its duty to defend
and/or indemnify the insured where the alleged harm was caused by
localized, workplace manganese welding fumes. Clendenin Bros., Inc.
v. Us. Fire Ins. Co., 390 Md. 449, 889 A.2d 387 (2006). The Court's
holding is consistent with the overall purpose of commercial liability
insurance coverage. More specifically, this holding also adheres to the
historical purpose behind total pollution exclusion provisions, which is
to allow insurers to avoid expensive litigation by denying coverage to
the insured in cases where environmental pollution is unrelated to the
insured's business practices.
U.S. Fire Insurance Co. ("Insurer") provided the Clendenin
Brothers, Inc. ("Insured") with insurance coverage for claims alleging
personal injuries arising out of the use of the Insured's welding
products. The Insurer sought a declaratory judgment claiming it had
no duty to defend or indemnify the Insured in cases where individuals
sustained bodily harm and neurological damage from manganese
fumes emitted while using the Insured's welding products. Insurer
asserted that the "Total Pollution Exclusion" clause contained in the
Insured's policy excluded them from providing coverage for injuries
caused by such fumes because they constituted a pollutant under the
language of the policy.
Each party filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the United
States District Court of Maryland. The Insured also filed a Motion for
Certification requesting the District Court to certify questions of law
regarding the scope of the total pollution exclusion under Maryland
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law to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The District Court stayed
the consideration of the Motions for Summary Judgment pending the
Court of Appeals' response to the certified question.
To determine whether the Insurer had a duty to provide coverage,
the Court of Appeals engaged in a two-part inquiry: "(1) what is the
coverage and what are the defenses under the terms and requirements
of the insurance policy?; and (2) do the allegations in the tort action
potentially bring the tort claim within the policy's coverage?"
Clendenin Bros., Inc., 390 Md. at 458, 889 A.2d at 393; articulated in
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 193,438
A.2d 282, 285 (1981). In addressing the first prong of the analysis, the
Court construed the policy as a whole and each word within the
contract was given its ordinary and usual meaning pursuant to
established principles of insurance contract interpretation. Clendenin
Bros., Inc., 390 Md. at 459,889 A.2d at 393. The Court also looked to
the nature, purpose, and facts surrounding the contract to identify the
intention of the parties. Id. Upon this examination, the Court
determined that the language of the provision was ambiguous,
meaning "a reasonably prudent person" could interpret the provision
to include or not include manganese welding fumes. Id. at 461, 889
A.2d at 394.
Given the ambiguous nature of the language within the provision,
the Court referred to extrinsic evidence. Id. at 459, 462, 889 A.2d at
393, 395. The Court acknowledged that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit previously held that an insurer had no
duty to defend an insured against allegations of injuries caused by
manganese welding fumes, as these fumes are included within the
definition of pollutant. Id. at 461, 889 A.2d at 395; see Nat 'I Elec.
Mfrs. Ass 'n v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 162 F .3d 824-25 (4th Cir.
1998).
However, the Court of Appeals, analyzed the subject clauses in a
different manner than the Fourth Circuit. Clendenin Bros., Inc., 390
Md. at 461, 889 A.2d at 395. The policy provides in pertinent part:
This Insurance does not apply to:
f. (1) "Bodily Injury" or "property damage" which

would not have occurred in whole or part but for the
actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants at
any time.
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Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal
irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot,
fumes, acid, alkalis, chemicals and waste.
Id. at 453, 889 A.2d at 390. As defmed in the policy, pollutant, among
other things, specifically refers to fumes. Id. at 461, 889 A.2d at 395.
However, the Court reasoned that in order to qualify as a pollutant
under the definition provided, the physical matter must also constitute
an irritant or contaminant. Id. In support, the Court opined that any
other interpretation of this provision would result in a limitless list of
pollutants, which could not have been the intention of the parties. Jd.
at 426, 889 A.2d at 395.
However, requiring that the substance be an irritant or contaminant
leaves a potentially infinite number of pollutants. Id. The Court
observed that under the right conditions any substance could constitute
an irritant or contaminant. Id. at 464, 889 A.2d 396. The Court cited,
as an example, how chlorine in a public pool could be considered an
irritant and/or contaminant but most would not qualify it as a pollutant.
Id.; see Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 512-13, 667 A.2d
617,621 (1995).
In response to this limitless list, the Court looked to the nature and
use of the alleged pollutant. Clendenin Bros., Inc., 390 Md. 462, 889
A.2d 395. In comparison to carbon monoxide, which most would
certainly consider a harmful substance, manganese is a natural element
that is used by welders in manufacturing steel. Id. Although it cannot
be denied that manganese is potentially harmful and toxic in nature, it
cannot be characterized as a pollutant or contaminant because it is
used intentionally and legally. Id. at 463,889 A.2d at 396.
The Court of Appeals previously held in Sullins that an insurer had
a duty to defend an insured against claims alleging injury from lead
paint exposure, basing their decision on a review of the historical
development of the total pollution exclusion clause. Jd. at 464-65, 889
A.2d at 397; see Sullins, 340 Md. at 515-16, 667 A.2d at 623. The
Court of Appeals concluded, like other federal and state courts, that
this type of pollution exclusion was only intended by insurers to
extend to environmental pollution. Clendenin Bros., Inc., 390 Md. at
465,889 A.2d at 397.
Additional support for this conclusion is found by taking into
consideration that the purpose of commercial liability insurance
coverage is to protect the insured from routine commercial hazards.
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Id. at 466-67, 889 A.2d at 398. According to the Court, InJunes
caused by welding fumes that were sustained during the normal course
of business are considered to be routine commercial hazards. Id. at
467, 889 A.2d at 398. In sum, the Court's response to the first prong
of the two-part inquiry was that the insurance policy's total pollution
exclusion provision did not include localized, workplace manganese
welding fumes. Id.

The Court's second inquiry was whether this claim would
potentially fall within the policy's coverage. Id. at 458, 889 A.2d at
393. The Court, with little discussion, answered in the affirmative for
the reason that these allegations "potentially could be covered under
the insurance policies." Id. at 468, 889 A.2d at 399. Therefore, the
Insurer was obligated to defend and/or indemnify the Insured for these
claims. Id. at 467-68, 889 A.2d at 398-99.
The narrow interpretation of standard total pollution exclusion
provisions in insurance policies exemplifies the Court's intention to
prohibit the insurer from using ambiguities in its policies to the
disadvantage of the insured by denying coverage for good faith claims.
Id. at 467, 889 A.2d at 398; see West Am. Ins. Co. v. Tufco Flooring
East, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 312, 409 S.E.2d 692, 697 (N.C. Ct. App.
1991). Although this specific situation will likely continue to be
litigated in other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has
declined to accept a virtually boundless interpretation of these
pollution exclusion clauses as they apply to manganese welding
fumes, thereby affording some protection to the insured.

